LINEAR PROGRAMMING APPROACH IN COOPERATIVE GAMES

  • Victor V.Zakharov (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes St. Petersburg State University ) ;
  • Kwon, O-Hun (Department of Mathematics Korea University)
  • Published : 1997.05.01

Abstract

In this paper we consider TU-cooperative games in the form of characteristic function. We notice that if one uses the necessary and sufficient condition for the core to be not empty in a dual form, it may be used for selecting the final outcome in the core. Using the linear programming approach for constructing the subcore, which is a subset of the core, we represent it in a simple form. We consider reduced games due to Davis-Mashler, Moulin and Funaki and formulate the sufficient conditions for the subcore to be S-consistent.

Keywords

References

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