The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A (대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A)

The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers (대한전기학회)
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Analysis on Unit-Commitment Game in Oligopoly Structure of the Electricity Market

전력시장 과점구조에서의 발전기 기동정지 게임 해석

  • 이광호 (단국대 전기전자컴퓨터공학부)
  • Published : 2003.11.01
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Abstract

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.

Keywords

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