The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A (대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A)

The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers (대한전기학회)
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A Study on the Selection of a Bidding Parameter at the Bidding Function Model in an Electricity Market

전력시장 입찰함수모형에서 입찰 파라미터 선택에 관한 연구

  • 조철희 (단국대 전기공학과) ;
  • 이광호 (단국대 전기전자컴퓨터공학부)
  • Published : 2004.11.01
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Abstract

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

Keywords

References

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