ATWS Frequency Quantification Focusing on Digital I&C Failures

  • Published : 2004.04.01

Abstract

The multi-tasking feature of digital I&C equipment could increase risk concentration because the I&C equipment affects the actuation of the safety functions in several ways. Anticipated Transient without Scram (ATWS) is a typical case of safety function failure in nuclear power plants. In a conventional analysis, mechanical failures are treated as the main contributors of the ATWS. This paper quantitatively presents the probability of the ATWS based on a fault tree analysis of a Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant is also presented. An analysis of the digital equipment in the digital plant protection system. The results show that the digital system severely affects the ATWS frequency. We also present the results of a sensitivity study, which show the effects of the important factors, and discuss the dependency between human operator failure and digital equipment failure.

Keywords

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