Korean Public Administration Review (한국행정학보)

The Korean Association for Public Administration (한국행정학회)
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Transaction cost and the Design of Regulatory Institutions: Focused on Class Action

거래비용과 규제제도의 설계: 증권관련집단소송제도를 중심으로

Park, Seong-Min
박성민

  • Published : 20060000
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Abstract

Transaction cost and the Design of Regulatory Institutions: Focused on Class Action Sung Min Park Class Action was introduced in 2005 that now show the change of transaction costs. In the future, policy deciders have to make institutions which have the smallest transaction cost. Transaction cost is made up of three parts, information cost, monitoring cost, and litigation cost. An assumption of human behavior is based on evolutionary psychology. The way to improve efficiency is evolution in renovating technology to lower input production factors and to decrease transaction cost. The role of institutions is to minimize transaction cost. Class Action will have the effect of decreasing the transaction cost with many sub-effects. Policy makers must make sub-institutions and make circumstances more competitive. Key words: Class action, institutionalism, institutional change

2005년 증권관련집단소송제도가 도입되었고 이에 따른 거래비용의 변화를 관측할 수 있다. 향후 거래비용을 최소화하는 효율적인 제도를 만들기 위해서 제도의 세부적인 설계에 대해서 검토하였다. 거래비용은 정보비용, 감시비용, 집행비용으로 정의하였다. 효율성의 증대가 사회의 진화라고 한다면 그 방법은 생산기술의 혁신, 생산요소의 투입증가, 거래비용의 절감의 3가지 방법이 있다. 제도의 역할은 주로 거래비용을 절감하는데 있다. 증권관련집단소송제도는 거래비용을 절감하는 효과를 가져올 것이고, 현재도 일부 비용을 기업측에서 떠안고 있음을 볼 수가 있다. 향후 세부적인 제도의 정립등의 과제가 남아 있기 때문에 제도가 완전하게 만들어진 상황이 아니고 거래비용을 정확하게 예측하기는 어려운 실정이다. 정책결정자들은 제도를 단순히 정치적인 과정으로 보기보다는 거래비용을 줄이고, 공정한 경쟁을 심화시키는 뱡향으로 노력하여야한다

Keywords

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