Nuclear Engineering and Technology

Korean Nuclear Society (한국원자력학회)
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FAULT-TOLERANT DESIGN FOR ADVANCED DIVERSE PROTECTION SYSTEM

  • Received : 2013.09.24
  • Accepted : 2013.10.07
  • Published : 2013.11.25
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Abstract

For the improvement of APR1400 Diverse Protection System (DPS) design, the Advanced DPS (ADPS) has recently been developed to enhance the fault tolerance capability of the system. Major fault masking features of the ADPS compared with the APR1400 DPS are the changes to the channel configuration and reactor trip actuation equipment. To minimize the fault occurrences within the ADPS, and to mitigate the consequences of common-cause failures (CCF) within the safety I&C systems, several fault avoidance design features have been applied in the ADPS. The fault avoidance design features include the changes to the system software classification, communication methods, equipment platform, MMI equipment, etc. In addition, the fault detection, location, containment, and recovery processes have been incorporated in the ADPS design. Therefore, it is expected that the ADPS can provide an enhanced fault tolerance capability against the possible faults within the system and its input/output equipment, and the CCF of safety systems.

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References

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