The Korean Journal of Applied Statistics (응용통계연구)

The Korean Statistical Society (한국통계학회)
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The Analysis of Roll Call Data from the 18th Korean National Assembly: A Bayesian Approach

제 18대 국회 기명투표 분석: 베이즈(Bayesian) 방법론 적용

  • Hahn, Kyu S. (Department of Communication, Seoul National University) ;
  • Kim, Yuneung (Department of Statistics, Seoul National University) ;
  • Lim, Jongho (Department of Statistics, Iowa State University) ;
  • Lim, Johan (Department of Statistics, Seoul National University) ;
  • Kwon, Suhyun (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University) ;
  • Lee, Kyeong Eun (Department of Statistics, Kyungpook National University)
  • Received : 2014.02.19
  • Accepted : 2014.06.16
  • Published : 2014.08.31
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Abstract

We apply a Bayesian estimation procedure to the analysis of roll call voting records on 2,389 bills processed during the 18th Korean National Assembly. The analysis of roll calls yields useful tools for to combining the measurement of legislative preference with the models of legislative behavior. The current Bayesian procedure is extremely exible, applicable to any legislative setting, irrespective of the extremism of the legislator's voting history or the number of roll calls available for analysis. It can be applied to any legislative settings, providing a useful solution to many statistical problems inherent in the analysis of roll call voting records. We rst estimate the ideal points of all members of the 18th National Assembly and their condence intervals. Subsequently, using the estimated ideal points, we examine the factional disparity within each major party using the estimated ideal points. Our results clearly suggest that there exists a meaningful ideological spectrum within each party. We also show how the Bayesian procedure can easily be extended to accommodate theoretically interesting theoretical models of legislative behavior. More specically, we demonstrate how the estimated posterior probabilities can be used for identifying pivotal legislators.

본 연구는 국회의 기명투표 분석에 적용될 수 있는 베이즈 방법론을 사용하여 지난 18대 국회에서 처리된 2,389개의 법안에 대한 표결기록을 분석하였다. 기명투표 분석은 의정연구에 관련된 이론적 가설의 실증적 검증을 위한 기초 데이터를 제공하는 경우가 많아 정치학 연구 전반의 발전을 위해 매우 중요한 의미를 가진다. 기명투표 분석에 있어 베이즈 방법론은 기존의 빈도주의적 방법론을 적용할 때 발생할 수 있는 통계적 문제들에 대한 훌륭한 대안을 제시한다. 본 연구에서는 Clinton 등 (2004)가 제안한 베이지언 방법론을 적용, 18대 국회에서 처리된 모든 법안에 대한 표결기록을 분석하여 개별 의원들의 최대선호점(ideal points)과 신뢰구간을 추정했다. 본 연구에서 제안한 방법론의 유용성 을 보여주기 위해 시범적으로 두 가지 경우에 대한 분석을 실시하였다. 하나는 널리 알려진 세 개의 의원 소모임의 최대선호점을 살펴봄으로써 한국 의회 내에 유의미한 표결성향의 스펙트럼이 존재하는지를 살펴보았다. 다른 하나는 제안된 방법론을 활용하여 어떻게 이론적 가설의 검증이 이루어질 수 있는지를 보여주기 위해 18대 국회의 '중간축'과 '몸싸움 방지축'의 위치와 두 중추적 위치에 해당할 가능성이 높은 의원들이 누구인지를 살펴보았다.

Keywords

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